We study the positionality of trigger strategies Nash equilibria σ for the N -player SCAR games Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) (with N ≥ 3). Our study is exhaustive with respect to types of graphs G, initial states s 0 and values of N, γ, ε. We conclude that in the majority of cases, profiles σ are nonpositional. Whenever σ are positional a key role is played by paths and the ε, γ values (especially whether ε > 0 or not). A crucial concept in our analysis is the state cop number, which is first introduced in the current paper.
Introduction
In [3] we introduce the game of selfish cops and adversarial robber (SCAR) denoted by Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε). This can be seen as an N -player variant of the classic, two-player cops and robber (CR) game [4, 6] where each of the N −1 cops is controlled by a different player (whereas in CR a single player controls all cops). G denotes the graph of the game, s 0 the starting state or position and γ, ε are game parameters. In that paper we prove (among other results) that Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) has a Nash equilibrium (NE) in trigger strategies [7] which is generally nonpositional (i.e., some player's next move depends on the past).
In the current paper we explore conditions on the form of G, s 0 and the values of N, γ, ε under which a trigger strategies NE of Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) is actually positional (i.e., each player's next move depends only on the current state). To obtain an exhaustive list of such conditions it is necessary to use a graph classification based on a novel concept, the state cop number, which is a refinement of the classic cop number [1] .
Preliminaries
All graphs considered here are undirected, finite, connected and simple. N (u) denotes the open neighborhood of vertex u, d(u, v) the distance between u and v and |A| the cardinality of set A. In classic CR, c (G) denotes the cop number of graph G, defined as the minimum number of cops needed to ensure capture from any possible starting position.
In this paper we focus on auxiliary games Γ n N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) which we use in [3] to prove the existence of a NE in Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε). The full story can be found in [3] ; here we present basic notation and facts.
For each n ∈ {1, ..., N }, Γ n N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) is a zero-sum two-player stochastic game [2] played on the graph G = (V, E); γ ∈ (0, 1) and ε ∈ 0, 1 N −1 are game parameters. Player P n controls the n-th token, i.e., cop C n for n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, or the robber R for n = N ; player P −n controls the rest tokens.
A state s of the game has the form s = x 1 , ..., x N , n where x i ∈ V is the location of the i-th token and n ∈ {1, ..., N } is the token moving next. S denotes the set of all states and can be partitioned as:
1. S = S c ∪ S nc ∪ {τ } where, S c is the set of capture states, in which at least one C n is on the same vertex as R (i.e., x n = x N ), S nc the set of noncapture states where no C n is on the same vertex as R and τ the terminal state that finally occurs in case of capture; or 2. S = ∪ N n=1 S n ∪ {τ } where S n := s : s = x 1 , ..., x N , n is the set of states in which the n-th token has the move.
The game begins at some initial state s 0 , which also specifies the first token to move. In each turn a single token is moved from its current vertex to a neighboring one, always following the sequence ..., C 1 , C 2 , ..., C N −1 , R, C 1 , ... . The game lasts an infinite number of turns but is effectively over as soon as capture occurs, if it does, since right after the system moves to state τ and stays there ad infinitum.
Regarding the players' payoffs and since Γ n N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) is a zero-sum game, it suffices to specify P n 's payoff. If the capture time (i.e., the first time that a capture state s ∈ S c occurs) is t, then:
1. in the game Γ N N (G|s 0 , γ, ε), P N 's payoff is −γ t ;
2. in the game Γ n N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) (n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}), P n 's payoff is
(1 − ε) K γ t : when K cops (K ∈ {1, ..., N − 2} ) including C n are in the same vertex as R; ε N − K − 1 γ t : when K cops (K ∈ {1, ..., N − 2} ) but no C n are in the same vertex as R; γ t N − 1 : when all N − 1 cops are in the same vertex as R.
In case capture never takes place, P n 's payoff is zero. P −n 's payoff is always the negative of P n 's. Γ N N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) is essentially the modified CR game introduced in [3] , the basic difference with classic CR being that time is counted in turns instead of rounds; a single token, cop or robber, moves in each turn. Hence P −N aims to effect capture as soon as possible and P N aims to delay it as much as possible. In this case the players' optimal strategies depend on G and s 0 , but not on γ, ε.
In games Γ n N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) however, where C n plays against the robber and N − 2 "robber-friendly" cops, the players' optimal strategies depend also on the values of γ, ε. If ε > 0, then P −n 's best outcome is evasion of the robber and from then on, depending on γ, ε and the respective capture times he may prefer a capture by one of his tokens, or a joint capture involving also C n , or a late as possible pure C n capture. The difference in case ε = 0 is that P −n is indifferent between letting the robber evade and capturing him by one of his tokens, since in both cases he gets his best outcome, i.e., a zero payoff.
We will shortly return to these optimal strategies. But first let us introduce a few additional notions.
A history h = (s 0 , s 1 , ...) is a finite or infinite sequence of states. Let H f denote the set of finite length histories (s 0 , ..., s), H n f those where token n moves, i.e., s ∈ S n and H n f nc those where s ∈ S n ∩S nc . A pure (or deterministic) strategy for the m-th token is a function σ m which maps finite histories to next moves. That is, ∀h = (s 0 , s 1 , ..., s t ) ∈ H f : σ m (h) = v specifies that: if the game started at s 0 and passed through s 1 , ..., s t , then next the m-th token should move to vertex v.
A strategy is positional (or stationary Markovian) if it depends only on the current state s t , i.e.,
A strategy profile (or, simply a profile) is a tuple σ = σ 1 , ..., σ N . A profile is positional if it consists solely of positional strategies. Otherwise it is called nonpositional.
Standard results [2] yield that the players in games Γ n N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) have optimal, pure positional strategies for all n, s 0 and γ, ε. This is the only kind of strategies we consider then for these games.
Furthermore, since P n controls only the n-th token, his strategy consists of a single function σ n ; a P −n strategy though is a "vector" function σ −n = (σ m ) m∈{1,...,N }\n with one strategy for each of P −n 's tokens; and both players' strategies together yield profile σ = σ 1 , ..., σ N = (σ n , σ −n ).
Since the form of the games is deterministic, if moreover the players use pure strategies, the games evolve deterministically. That is, given an initial state s and a pure strategy profile σ, the tuple (s, σ) leads in a deterministic manner to either capture or evasion of the robber.
Keeping the above in mind, in the sequel, we will need the following definitions. T (s, σ) denotes the capture time (finite or not) starting from state s under pure profile σ. σ n denotes a pure positional optimal strategy for the n-th token in modified CR game Γ N N (G|s 0 , γ, ε), and Σ n the set of all σ n 's. Strategies σ n will be called CR-optimal.
Note that: for any initial state s and CR-optimal profile σ = ( σ 1 , ..., σ N ) such that (s, σ) leads to capture, it is always the same cop effecting capture and at the same time T (s, σ). This follows from the facts: (i) in each turn only one token moves and (ii) under CR-optimal play, R does never run into a cop 1 . Let C(s) then denote the cop effecting capture under every CR-optimal profile σ, when the game starts at s, and T (s) := T (s, σ) the respective number of moves. If C(s) = C m for some m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, then at times we denote this by C m (s).
Finally, for all n, m ∈ {1, ..., N }, let φ n m be an optimal, pure positional strategy for the n-th token in game Γ m N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) (where dependence on γ, ε has been supressed); let Φ n m be the respective set. We now turn to SCAR games Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) and the so-called trigger strategies profiles σ, where σ := σ 1 , ..., σ N and each trigger strategy σ n is composed from strategies φ n m as follows: For all h = (s 0 , ..., s) ∈ H f σ n (h) := φ n n (s) as long as every player m ∈ {1, ..., N } \n follows φ m m ; φ n m (s) as soon as some player m ∈ {1, ..., N } \n deviates from φ m m . In general, σ n is nonpositional by construction (and so is σ then) since it takes into account the players' past behavior. However, if φ n n (s) = φ n m (s) for all m and "relevant" states s, σ n becomes positional. To better understand the meaning of this latter condition, consider the following. Roughly speaking, cop C n 's optimal strategy φ n n in the game Γ n N (where he plays against a "coalition" of the remaining players) must be also optimal (i) in every game Γ m N with m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} \n (where he and the remaining players ally against cop C m ) and (ii) in the CR game Γ N N (where he and the remaining cops chase the robber). In other words: σ is positional iff, for every m and n, the n-th token's CR-optimal strategy σ n is also optimal in Γ m N . This can be stated formally as follows.
Condition 2.1 Let σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ N ) be a trigger strategies profile in Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) with σ n consisting of (φ n m ) N m=1 . Then σ is positional (resp. nonpositional) iff A1 (resp. A2) holds:
A2 : ∃n, m ∈ {1, ..., N } : ∀ σ n ∈ Σ n , ∃h = (s 0 , ..., s) ∈ H n f nc : φ n m (s) = σ n (s).
The goal of this paper is to explore the form of graphs G and initial states s 0 and the values of parameters N , γ and ε, under which, each of the mutually exclusive conditions A1 or A2 holds. Given Γ N N is the modified CR, Φ n N = Σ n and A1 holds always for m = N . Hence we will be examining the remaining cases.
Analysis
The study is divided as follows. In Section 3.1 we study the case |V | = 2, ε ≥ 0 and in Section 3.2 the case |V | > 2, ε > 0; Section 3.3 concerns the case |V | > 2, ε = 0 and is further divided in Section 3.3.1, where c(G) ≤ N − 1, and in Section 3.3.2, where c(G) > N − 1.
To avoid trivialities we only consider initial states s 0 ∈ S nc .
Case
Then Γ 3 (G|s 0 , γ, ε) has a (unique) positional trigger strategies profile σ iff ε ∈ 0,
Proof. The set of noncapture states is S nc = {(1, 1, 2, 1), (1, 1, 2, 2), (1, 1, 2, 3), (2, 2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1, 2), (2, 2, 1, 3)} .
Due to symmetry we only consider initial states s 0 = (1, 1, 2, n), n ∈ {1, 2, 3}; then each (1, 1, 2, n) has two possible successors (e.g., the successors of (1, 1, 2, 1) are (1, 1, 2, 1) and (1, 1, 2, 2)) i.e., given s 0 , each token has two positional strategies. Thus, in this case Condition A1 becomes:
We examine under which conditions (3) holds and hence σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) is positional.
To begin with, the (unique) CR-optimal strategies are: for the cops, σ 1 (1, 1, 2, 1) = σ 2 (1, 1, 2, 2) = 2 (immediate capture), and for the robber σ 3 (1, 1, 2, 3) = 2 (stay in place). I. In game Γ 1 3 (G|s 0 , γ, ε) (P 1 controls C 1 , P −1 controls C 2 and R) we have the following. For token C 1 , the unique optimal strategy φ 1 1 ∈ Φ 1 1 prescribes immediate capture at s = (1, 1, 2, 1), i.e., φ 1 1 (s) = 2. Indeed, if C 1 captures say at time t, then P 1 's payoff is (1 − ε)γ t . Otherwise, depending on the values of γ, ε, P −1 will optimally play so that, either C 2 effects capture in the next move, and then P 1 's payoff will be εγ t+1 , or C 2 stays put and R runs into both C 1 , C 2 in the next move, and P 1 's payoff will be 1 2 γ t+2 . But (1 − ε) γ t > max εγ t+1 , 1 2 γ t+2 for all (γ, ε) ∈ (0, 1) × [0, 1 2 ]. Hence,
For token C 2 , moving at time t from state s = (1, 1, 2, 2) we have the following possibilities.
1. C 2 captures at t; P −1 's loss is εγ t ;
2. C 2 stays put at t, R runs into both C 1 , C 2 at t + 1; P −1 's loss is 1 2 γ t+1 ; 3. C 2 and R stay put and C 1 captures at t + 2;
For a positional σ 2 , P −1 must not prefer (2) or (3) to (1), i.e.,
Given γ < 1, from γ ≥ 2ε we get ε < 1 2 . Therefore,
guarantee the existence of a φ 2 1 such that:
For token R, moving at time t from state s = (1, 1, 2, 3) we have the following possibilities.
1. R stays put at t and C 1 effects capture at t + 1;
For a positional σ 3 , P −1 must not prefer (2) to (1):
II. In game Γ 2 3 (G|s 0 , γ, ε) (P 2 controls C 2 , P −2 controls C 1 and R) we have the following. Regarding token C 2 : moving at t from s = (1, 1, 2, 2), the unique optimal strategy prescribes immediate capture, i.e., φ 2 2 (s) = 2 = σ 2 (s), for all (γ, ε) ∈ (0, 1) × [0, 1 2 ]. Indeed, P 2 's payoff in this case is (1 − ε)γ t . Otherwise, optimally R stays in place at t + 1 and at t + 2
Regarding token C 1 :
For a positional σ 1 it must be:
Regarding the robber token R we have the following possibilities.
1. R stays put at time t and C 1 effects capture at t + 1; P −2 's loss is εγ t+1 ;
2. R and C 1 stay put and C 2 captures at time t + 2;
For a positional σ 3 (1) must be at least as good for P −2 as (2) and (3). By (8) we have,
and P −2 does not prefer (2) to (1) . For (1) to be at least as good as (3) it must be εγ t+1 ≤ 1 2 γ t . If ε = 0, this holds always. If ε > 0 it must be
For a positional profile σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , (6)-(9) must all hold; this yields the required result.
Then every trigger strategies profile σ of Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) is nonpositional, for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Consider game Γ 1 N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) (P 1 controls C 1 , P −1 controls C 2 , C 3 , ..., C N −1 and R). Let s = (1, ..., 1, 2, 2) and consider C 2 's optimal move at time t from s. If C 2 captures R, then P −1 's loss is εγ t ; if C 2 stays put and C 3 captures at t + 1, P −1 's loss is εγ t+1 < εγ t (since ε > 0). So for the unique φ 2 1 , σ 2 it is φ 2 1 (s) = 1 = 2 = σ 2 (s). We conclude that σ 2 and hence σ is always nonpositional.
let N > 3 and ε = 0. The following hold.
1. Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) has at least one nonpositional trigger strategies profile σ, for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
2. Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) has at least one positional trigger strategies profile σ iff γ ∈ 0, 1 N −1 .
Proof. All s ∈ S nc are of the form s = (v 1 , ..., v 1 , v 2 , n) with v 1 = v 2 (no cop is in the same vertex as the robber). At any such state s the unique CR-optimal strategies are:
1. Consider game Γ 1 N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) and token C 2 having the next move at state s = (v 1 , ..., v 1 , v 2 , 2). Moving to v 2 effects a capture which gives P −1 his minimum loss of 0; but so does staying in place, provided some other C k (k ∈ {3, ..., N − 1}) effects the capture. Thus there exists φ 2
Hence there exists σ 2 and thus σ which is nonpositional.
If C m does not capture immediately, then optimally P −m effects a C n (n = m) capture any time before C m resulting to a payoff of 0 < γ t for P m . So P m prefers immediate capture and thus for the only φ m
. For C n (n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} \m): moving to v 2 effects a capture which gives P −m his minimum loss of 0. Thus there exists φ n m :
.., N − 1}, then R optimally stays put and capture is effected by any C n with n < m, resulting to a loss of 0 for P −m . For m = 1 we have the following. If R stays put at time t, C 1 captures at t + 1 and P −m 's loss is ( 
. Hence, A1 holds and a positional profile σ exists iff γ ∈ 0, 1 N −1 .
Case |V | ≥ 3 and ε > 0
From this point on, unless otherwise specified, we consider N ≥ 3.
Proof. Given |V | ≥ 3, from any s 0 it is possible to reach at some t a state s
Hence, at s, P −1 prefers to defer capture and never capture with C 2 . Thus,
Consequently every σ 2 and corresponding profile σ is nonpositional.
3.3 Case |V | ≥ 3 and ε = 0 Proposition 3.5 Let G = (V, E) with |V | ≥ 3 and ε = 0. Then in every game Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) there exists always a nonpositional trigger strategies profile σ, for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Given |V | ≥ 3, from any starting s 0 it is possible to reach at some t state s
. Now, under no CR-optimal σ N R ever moves to v 2 . In game Γ 1 N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) though P −1 can, under optimal play move R to v 2 since then he has a minimum loss of
i.e., there always exists a nonpositional σ N and a corresponding nonpositional σ.
Case
In this part of the paper we connect positionality of σ to the cop number c (G) of graph G. First we examine the case where G is a path (hence c (G) = 1) with |V | ≥ 3. 2 Proposition 3.6 Let G be a path with |V | ≥ 3; let ε = 0. Then Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) has a positional trigger strategies profile σ iff (i) s 0 is such that all cops are to one side of the robber, and (ii) γ ∈ 0, 1 N −1 .
Proof. Let S ′ nc denote the set of states where the robber is between some cops and S ′′ nc = S nc \S ′ nc the set of states where all cops are to one side of the robber. In Part I we show that in every game Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) with s 0 ∈ S ′ nc every σ is nonpositional. In part II then we show that, if s 0 ∈ S ′′ nc , then a positional σ exists iff γ ∈ 0, 1 N −1 . The combination of Parts I and II yields the result sought.
I. Initial states s 0 ∈ S ′ nc . From any such s 0 we can always reach, at say time t, a state s in which R has the move, some cops are immediately to his left and the rest are immediately to his right. Now, every CR-optimal robber strategy σ N at state s dictates that the robber stays in place. In game Γ 1 N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) on the contrary, every optimal strategy φ N 1 at s dictates that the robber moves into the vertex not occupied by C 1 , because this yields a minimum loss of εγ t = 0 for P −n , whereas otherwise C 1 optimally captures right after and P −n 's loss is ( 
Hence in this case, every strategy σ N and corresponding profile σ is nonpositional.
II. Initial states s 0 ∈ S ′′ nc . Let (without loss of generality) S ′′ ncl ⊂ S ′′ nc be the states where all cops are to the left of R; for every s 0 ∈ S ′′ ncl let S ′′ ncl (s 0 ) be the set of states that can occur starting from s 0 , i.e.,
Observe that, for all s 0 ∈ S ′′ ncl , S ′′ ncl (s 0 ) = S ′′ ncl . Then existence of a positional σ implies:
∀m, n ∈ {1, ..., N }, ∃φ n m , σ n : ∀s ∈ S ′′ ncl ∩ S n , φ n m (s) = σ n (s).
Given G is a path, for any s ∈ S ′′ ncl and under every CR-optimal profile σ, the cop C (s) that captures is the one that is "closer" to R, taking also into account whose turn is to move and at time T (s). Let σ * = ( σ 1 * , ..., σ N * ) be the CR-optimal profile where, C n (n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1}) always moves towards R, and R moves away from the cops, reaches the end of the path and waits there until capture. Instead of (10) we show the following which is equivalent:
Now fix an m ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1} for the rest of the proof and consider game Γ m N (G|s 0 , γ, ε). We partition S ′′ ncl into two mutually disjoint sets S A , S B defined below and examine each case separately. If s ∈ S B 1 , then under optimal play (in Γ m N (G|s 0 , γ, ε)) C m chases R till the end of the path and captures him at time T (s); this describes the optimal strategies for C m and R. The remaining tokens C n cannot affect the outcome. Thus, any strategy is optimal for them and so is the chosen σ n * . Hence ∀n ∈ {1, ..., N } ∃φ n m : ∀s ∈ S B 1 ∩ S n , φ n m (s) = σ n * (s).
Let now s ∈ S B 2 . First note that the only optimal strategies for P m in this case are strategies σ m ∈ Σ m . Indeed, and for any strategy σ −m of P −m , if P m uses any σ m for C m the outcome is either a pure C m capture, at the fastest possible time, or a joint capture, at the fastest possible time. Any other strategy of P m leads to suboptimal for him outcomes, even to pure C n (n = m) capture.
Assuming P m uses σ m * for C m , then P −m can effect a joint capture at some time t. First note that a joint capture can only happen after a move by R and only if he deviates from σ N , and second that this can only be at a time t < T (s). 3 Moreover it is clear that P −m always prefers the joint capture which: (i) happens at the latest possible time, call it T (s) and (ii) involves the largest possible number of his cops, call it K (s). Now note that both these maximum values are achieved by following σ −m * until T (s) − 1, at which time the robber is at the path end and K (s) + 1 cops are next to him and letting R fall on the cops at T (s); call this strategy σ −m . In this case P −m 's loss is
3 The latter is a consequence of the following: In a pure Cm capture under every σ, only the moves of Cm and R are relevant (i.e., the remaining cops cannot affect the outcome). Thus if P−m could effect a joint capture at t > T (s), given Cm follows σ m , he would be able to do so only due to moves of R. But if R alone could achieve capture later than T (s), when Cm uses σ m , then T (s) would not be the optimal CR time, which is a contradiction.
Alternatively, P −m can choose to stick to σ −m * until the end and let C m capture at T (s). Since at T (s) (resp. at T (s)) C m (resp. R) has the move, we have T (s) = T (s) + m. In this case P −m 's loss is
For a positional σ to exist (14) must hold for all s ∈ S B 2 and thus also for the minimum of
This quantity is increasing in m and decreasing in K (s) and thus takes its minimum for m = 1 and K (s) = N − 2, i.e., when C m = C 1 and at T (s) all cops are next to the robber. Then (14) becomes
Hence, under and only under (15) we have
Given
and combining (12), (13) and (16) yields that a positional trigger strategies profile σ exists iff (15) holds.
Remark 3.7
We now move on to graphs other than paths. It is not hard to see that, for any such graph and pair of noncapture states s 0 , s, there exists a history h which starts at s 0 and ends at s. I.e., ∀s 0 , s ∈ S nc , ∃h = (s 0 , ..., s) ∈ H f nc This means that, for every s 0 , the set of endstates of all finite noncapture histories starting at s 0 is exactly S nc . Thus Conditions A1, A2 for positional and nonpositional respectively profiles reduce to: Condition 3.8 Let σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ N ) be a trigger strategies profile in Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε), with σ n consisting of (φ n m ) N m=1 . Then σ is positional (resp. nonpositional) iff B1 (resp. B2) holds:
B2 : ∃n, m ∈ {1, ..., N } : ∀ σ n ∈ Σ n , ∃s ∈ S n ∩ S nc : φ n m (s) = σ n (s).
The next proposition settles the issue for all rest graphs G with c (G) ≤ N − 1. Then every trigger strategies profile σ is nonpositional for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Given G is not a path, it is |V | ≥ 3 and, G contains, or is equal to either the clique
By Remark 3.7 then we have that, for any initial state s 0 , the state s where, some of the cops are on vertex v 2 , the rest are on v 3 , the robber is on v 1 and it is the robber's turn to move can always occur. Moreover, c(G) ≤ N − 1 means that, starting from s, capture occurs under CR-optimal play by C( s); let C( s) = C m . Given Proposition 3.5, to show the current claim suffices to show there exist no positional profiles σ. Assume (towards contradiction) there exists positional profile σ. Now consider game Γ m N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) and the case where state s has been reached. Then it must be that, there exist optimal φ n m such that, Condition B1 is satisfied for that particular m and s = s. However, if a CR-optimal strategy σ n is used for every n ∈ {1, ..., N }, then starting from s, profile σ leads to capture by C m at T ( s), in which case P −m 's loss will be γ T ( s) > 0. But we know that, starting from s, P −m can achieve his minimum loss of 0 by moving R into whichever of v 2 or v 3 does not contain C m . Hence using σ n for every n ∈ {1, ..., N } is suboptimal for P −m when starting from s. Thus, there exists no positional σ.
Case: c (G) > N − 1
In this section we use the state cop number c N (G|s) defined in Appendix A. Thus we urge the reader to study this part before proceeding.
For any given N , we define G(N ) by
i.e., the set of graphs examined in this section 4 or, equivalently by (40), the set
Elements of G(3) include Dodecahedron and the Petersen graph (both of which have c(G) = 3) as well as any other graph resulting by bridging either of these to another graph. 5 The following propositions involve sets of graphs that form a partition of G(N ). Moreover, we sometimes simply write G rather than G(N ) and likewise for its constituents. Given N , consider the following subsets of G:
1. G 1 consists of those graphs in G where there exists a state starting from which, cooperation of two, or more cops, up to N − 1 is necessary and sufficient to ensure capture inΓ N (G). I.e.,
2. G ′ 1 is the complement of G 1 (with respect to G). Here, at every noncapture state, either the robber evades under CR-optimal play, or there exists a single cop who can ensure capture. I.e.,
3. Finally, G 2 consists of graphs such that, when it is the robber's turn to move, he can always evade. I.e.,
As we will shortly see, G 2 is a subset of G ′ 1 . The next proposition concerns G 1 . Note that holds, not only for ε = 0 but for every ε ∈ 0, 1 2 . 6 Proposition 3.10 Consider Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) with G ∈ G 1 and ε ∈ 0, 1 2 . Then every profile σ is nonpositional for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Let s ∈ S nc with c(G|s) = k ∈ {2, ..., N − 1}; let C(s) = C m . Consider game Γ m N (G|s, γ, ε) . Given c(G|s) ≥ 2, P −m can enforce robber evasion in Γ m N (G|s, γ, ε) . Hence it cannot be φ n m (s t ) = σ n (s t ) for all n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}\m and all states s t ∈ S n following s, because this allows P m to capture R and is suboptimal play for P −m . Hence, there exists at least one n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}\m and at least one s t ∈ S n following s such that, φ n m (s t ) = σ n (s t ), ∀ σ n ∈ Σ n , leading to the result sought. In the following lemma we show that G 1 ∩ G 2 = ∅ and hence G 2 ⊂ G ′ 1 .
Proof. Given N , assume on the contrary G 1 ∩ G 2 = ∅ and let G ∈ G 1 ∩ G 2 . G ∈ G 1 means there exists state s such that c(G|s) = k ∈ {2, ..., N − 1}. This in its turn means that, at s, there exists no cop who (a) is located next to R and (b) plays before R (because otherwise it would have been c(G|s) = 1). This again means that, starting from s and irrespective of the moves of the cops playing before R, R will have the chance to move i.e., the game will reach a state s ′ ∈ S N ∩ S nc . Now by assumption G belongs also to G 2 and thus c(G|s ′ ) = ∞ (i.e., starting from s ′ R evades under CR-optimal robber play). But then (from the previous argument) we have that, under CR-optimal robber play R evades also from s and thus c(G|s) = ∞, which however contradicts the assumption c(G|s) = k ∈ {2, ..., N − 1}. Hence there exists no such graph G and thus G 1 ∩ G 2 = ∅. Furthermore G ′ 1 clearly contains graphs that do not belong in G 2 and thus we have the following.
Remark 3.13 An important fact is the following: c(G|s) = ∞ for all s ∈ S N ∩ S nc implies that, under CR-optimal robber play, the only states that can lead to capture in any G ∈ G 2 are those where a cop is next to R and moves before him. 7
Next we identify one more set of graphs and respective games where positional profiles σ exist.
Proposition 3.14 Consider Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) with G ∈ G 2 and ε = 0. Then there exists a positional profile σ for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Fix an m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} for the rest of the proof and consider Γ m N (G|s 0 , γ, ε). We partition S nc into three mutually disjoint sets S A , S B and S C defined below and examine each case separately. Case A: s ∈ S A . For any s ∈ S A , if P −m uses any CR-optimal cop and robber strategies σ n (n ∈ {1, ..., N }\m) he can force evasion of R for any strategy of P m and get his minimum loss of 0. Given P −m 's strategy, P m cannot affect the outcome. Thus any strategy is optimal for him and so is any CR-optimal strategy σ m . Hence
Case B: s ∈ S B . By Remark 3.13, these are states such that: (i) a cop C n (n = m) is next the robber and moves before him and (ii) if there exists another cop C k who is also next the robber, then C k moves after C n . Now, for any s ∈ S B , if P −m uses any CR-optimal strategies σ n (n ∈ {1, ..., N }\m) C n captures at time T (s) for any strategy of P m and P −m gets his minimum loss of εγ T (s) = 0. Given P −m 's strategy, P m cannot affect the outcome. Thus any strategy is optimal for him and so is any CR-optimal strategy σ m . Hence ∀n ∈ {1, ..., N } ∃φ n m , σ n : ∀s ∈ S B ∩ S n , φ n m (s) = σ n (s).
Case C: s ∈ S C . By Remark 3.13, these are states such that: (i) cop C m is next to the robber and moves before him and (ii) if there exists another cop C n who is also next the robber, then C n moves after C m . Now, for any s ∈ S C , if P m uses any CR-optimal cop strategy σ m , then C m captures at time T (s) for any strategy of P −m and P m gets his maximum gain of (1 − ε)γ T (s) = γ T (s) . Given P m 's strategy, P −m cannot affect the outcome. Thus any strategy is optimal for him and so is any CR-optimal strategies σ n (n ∈ {1, ..., N }\m). Hence ∀n ∈ {1, ..., N } ∃φ n m , σ n : ∀s ∈ S C ∩ S n , φ n m (s) = σ n (s).
Combining(24)-(26) and S A ∪ S B ∪ S C = S nc we get the result sought.
Summarizing to this point we have: (a) partitions G = G 1 ∪ G ′ 1 and G ′ 1 = G 2 ∪ G ′ 2 and (b) G ′ 2 is the last class of graphs remaining to examine.
In search of positional profiles σ within G ′ 2 , a process of trial and error (coupled with some intuition) led us to the following (and the last) partition of G ′ 2 . G 3 is the subset of G ′ 2 with graphs satisfying the property that: at every state s with c(G|s) = 1, cop C m (s) (m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}) can always effect capture using σ m , no matter what the rest players do; G ′ 3 is the complement of G 3 with respect to G ′ 2 . Formally, given N and C m (s) (m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}) for all s ∈ S nc , define: where → (resp. →) means "leads to" (resp. does not lead to). The next proposition concerns graphs belonging to G ′ 3 . 8 Proposition 3.15 Consider Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) with G ∈ G ′ 3 and ε = 0. Then every profile σ is nonpositional for all γ ∈ (0, 1). is such that (s, σ m , σ −m ) does not lead to C m (s) capture, then, using σ −m P −m can force, either evasion of R, or capture by C n with n = m, achieving in both cases a minimum loss of 0 < γ T (s) . Hence, there exists at least one n ∈ {1, ..., N }\m and state s t ∈ S n following s where φ n m (s t ) = σ n (s t ), ∀ σ n ∈ Σ n and thus, every profile σ is nonpositional (and for all γ ∈ (0, 1)).
It remains to examine graphs in G 3 . As a first step, we aim to elucidate the form of such graphs. The following lemma makes clearer the distinction between sets G 3 and G ′ 3 . Proof. Clearly (28) implies (30). For (31), let s, σ −m satisfy the conditions in (29). If s ∈ S N then (31) holds. If s / ∈ S N , then starting from s (and for any strategy of the cops) the game will certainly reach a state s ′ ∈ S N (i.e., the robber will move at least once) by the following argument.
If the robber does not move at least once, then he is captured before he can move. This means that: at s a cop (a) is next to R and (b) moves before R. But then by definition this cop is C m (s), which contradicts condition (29).
So, let s ′ be the first state in S N that occurs starting from s, under profile ( σ m , σ −m ), where σ −m is the same as in (29). Then s ′ clearly satisfies (31) for this same σ −m .
Remark 3.17 Thus we see that for every G ∈ G 3 , each state s ∈ S N ∩ S nc is such that, either (i) c(G|s) = ∞, or (ii) c(G|s) = 1 and s satisfies condition (30).
Next we show that, for every state s satisfying (30), there is a state s which satisfies the exact same conditions as s and differs from s only in that the capturing cop C m is next to the robber. Proof. Letσ −m be the profile where all players besides C m stay put. Then, starting from s and under ( σ m ,σ −m ), there will come a time where C m reaches R's neighborhood (because otherwise R could stay put indefinitely and evade) and it is R's turn to move. Let the respective state be s. First note that s has the required form; and x m ∈ N (u) i.e., condition (i) holds. Now, given (s, σ m , σ −m ) leads to C m (s) capture for every σ −m , this must be also true for any profile σ −m that copiesσ −m until s occurs and follows any profile σ −m thereafter. Thus, ( s, σ m , σ −m ) leads to C m (s) capture for every σ −m and condition (iv) also holds. Conditions (ii)-(iii) follow immediately from (iv).
The following lemma reveals an important fact for graphs (as those in G 3 ) satisfying (30). Proof. 1. Assume towards contradiction |N (u)| ≥ 2. We distinguish the following cases.
1.
A. s is such that x m ∈ N (u). Then N (u) contains at least one more vertex z. There are two possibilities.
(i) z is occupied by some cop C i = C m (s). But this violates the requirement that (s, σ m , σ −m ) leads to C m (s) capture, for every σ −m since R can run into C i on his first move.
(ii) z is not occupied by any cop. Moving some cop C i = C m (s) to vertex z we create state s ′′ ∈ S N which differs from s only in C i 's new location. Now we have (a) c(G|s ′′ ) = 1 and (b) letting C(s ′′ ) = C n (where C n may be C m or C i ) then (given G ∈ G 3 ) we must have that (s ′′ , σ n , σ −n ) leads to C n capture for every σ −n . But (b) is violated since R can run into whichever cop is not C n (either C m or C i ).
Hence, if s is such that x m ∈ N (u) then |N (u)| = 1 and u is a leaf.
1.B. s is such that x m / ∈ N (u). Then there exists some s of the type described in Lemma 3.18 and we return to Case A.
We conclude that if s satisfies (30) then u is always a leaf.
2.
Assume on the contrary that v, the neighbor of u, is such that there exists s ′ = (y 1 , ..., y N −1 , v, N ) ∈ S N with c(G|s ′ ) = ∞; then, since G ∈ G 3 , it must be c(G|s ′ ) = 1; therefore, s ′ also satisfies (30). From Part 1 then we have that v is a leaf; given u is also a leaf, it follows that G is the path P 2 ; but this contradicts G ∈ G 3 . Corollary 3.20 Let G ∈ G 3 . Then u is not a leaf iff
(32)
Proof. The left to right implication follows from Lemma 3.19; the reverse from the fact that if u is a leaf, then there always exist states s with c(G|s) = 1 e.g those where a cop occupies u's neighbor. The last two results lead directly to the following characterization of the form of graphs in G 3 .
Corollary 3.21 Let G ∈ G 3 and u ∈ V (G). Then (i) either u is a leaf, in which case its neighbor satisfies the condition in Part 2 of Lemma 3.19 (ii) or u is not a leaf and then condition (32) holds.
Remark 3.22
In other words, Corollary 3.21 means that, G 3 consists of the graphs obtained by attaching to each graph G ∈ G 2 an arbitrary (but positive) number of leaves. Some graphs in G 3 then are graphs like Petersen, or Dodecahedron to which some leaves have been attached to.
The following proposition concludes this study. Proof. Take first any vertex u which is not a leaf. Then condition (32) holds. But (32) is the same as the defining condition of G 2 . Hence, the same analysis as that in Proposition 3.14 leads to the conclusion that: whenever the robber occupies a vertex that is not a leaf, every σ n ∈ Σ n is optimal for each token n ∈ {1, ..., N } and in every game Γ m N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) for m ∈ {1, ..., N } and γ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, we only need to examine cases where the robber occupies an arbitrary leaf of the graph. Fix an m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} for the rest of the proof and consider Γ m N (G|s 0 , γ, ε). For the arbitrary leaf u of G, let S ncu denote the set of all states s ∈ S nc where the robber occupies u. We now partition S ncu as follows and consider for each set of states players' P −m and P m optimal strategies. Case A: s ∈ S A . For any s ∈ S A , if P −m uses any CR-optimal (cop and robber) strategies σ n (n ∈ {1, ..., N }\m) he can force evasion of R for any strategy of P m and get his minimum loss of 0. Given P −m 's strategy, P m cannot affect the outcome. Thus any strategy is optimal for him and so is any CR-optimal strategy σ m . Hence ∀n ∈ {1, ..., N } ∃φ n m , σ n : ∀s ∈ S A ∩ S n , φ n m (s) = σ n (s).
Let us pause here and consider the form of states s = (x 1 , ..., x N −1 , u, n) (i.e., R occupies u) where capture can occur under CR-optimal play. Let v denote u's (unique) neighbor in G. Then it is not hard to see that, under CR-optimal play, a capture can occur iff there exists at least one cop C i , who is (i) either already at v, i.e., x i = v, or (ii) he can cover v in case R moves there, i.e., either (ii.a) d(x i , v) = 1, or (ii.b) d(x i , v) = 2 and C i moves before R. In any other case R can evade using σ N . Furthermore note that, in all such states s it is c(G|s) = 1 and C m (s) is the cop that is "closer" to R, taking into account also whose turn is to move. 9
Case B: s ∈ S B . Assume P m uses σ m for C m and consider the options of P −m . It can be seen that, depending on the state s, there exist only two possibilities, which partition further S B as follows:
1. States s ∈ S B 1 : C m effects a pure capture, for any strategy of P −m , and 2. States s ∈ S B 2 : P −m can effect a joint capture, i.e., one involving C m and some P −m cop tokens. 10 If s ∈ S B 1 , then under optimal play (in Γ m N (G|s 0 , γ, ε)) C m goes straight towards R, while R stays put and C m captures at time T (s). This describes the optimal strategies for C m and R. The remaining tokens C n cannot affect the outcome. Thus, any strategy is optimal for them and so is any σ n . Hence
If s ∈ S B 2 , then the exact same analysis as in case II.B. part 2 of Proposition 3.6 leads to the conclusion that, whereas for P m using σ m is always optimal in Γ m N (G|s 0 , γ, ε), P −m , uses optimally σ −m in Γ m N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) for all m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} and states s iff
Thus we have that iff (35) holds, then ∀n ∈ {1, ..., N } ∃φ n m , σ n : ∀s ∈ S B 2 ∩ S n , φ n m (s) = σ n (s).
Case C: s ∈ S C . In this case P −m employing CR-optimal strategies σ n for his cop and robber tokens results to capture by C n and his best outcome, i.e., a loss of 0. Similarly P m loses anyhow so he may as well employ σ m for his cop token C m . Hence, ∀n ∈ {1, ..., N } ∃φ n m , σ n : ∀s ∈ S C ∩ S n , φ n m (s) = σ n (s).
Given S A ∪ S B ∪ S C = S ncv for every leaf v of G and relations (33), (34), (36) and (37), we have that, iff (35) holds, then ∀n, m ∈ {1, ..., N } ∃φ n m , σ n : ∀s ∈ S ncu ∩ S n , φ n m (s) = σ n (s),
which completes the proof.
Conclusion
Our aim was to identify the cases of SCAR games Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) where, the generally nonpositional trigger strategies Nash equilibria σ [3] are in fact positional. The current, exhaustive study regarding the form and the values of of G, s 0 and N, γ, ε respectively showed that positional σ profiles exist in exceptional cases, as reflected in the following table.
cops on one side of the robber 0, 1 Clearly paths and the values of ε and γ play a major role. If ε > 0 where cops in the SCAR game Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) have an incentive to cooperate, a positional σ exists only in the exceptional (if not trivial) case where two cops chase the robber on the path P 2 and only for these values of γ. In all remaining cases σ are nonpositional. Also note that, games played on graphs in the class G 2 are the only ones where a path is not involved, since those in G 3 can be seen as graphs in G 2 connected to P 2 .
In addition to the above results, in the current study we have introduced the state cop number c(G|s). This was crucial in our analysis for the following reasons.
1. Purely graph theoretical notions do not suffice because they do not take into account the number of players. For example, if G is the Petersen graph, then: (i) if N = 3, G belongs to G 2 (N ) and all Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) possess positional profiles σ (see Proposition 3.14), whereas (ii) if N = 4, all Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε) possess only nonpositional profiles σ (see Proposition 3.9).
2. The same holds for the classical cop number c(G). For example, the study of G(N ) (i.e., the class of graphs with c(G) > N − 1) in Section 3.3.2, required a finer subdivision into six subclasses defined in terms of c(G|s).
In a future paper we intend to present a refined analysis of the N -player SCAR game, concentrating on subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) rather tnan NE. To this end, three elements of the current paper will prove especially useful. First of all, we will use the state cop number c (G|s), because finding SPE requires analysis of optimal play in every subgame Γ N (G|s, γ, ε), i.e., for every s and c(G|s) gives important information for this. Furthermore, the subdivision of class G(N ) and the analysis of zero-sum games Γ m N will also be useful.
A Appendix
Here we introduce the state s cop number c N (G|s) (or simply c (G|s), when N is taken for granted, or is implied by the context). The notions presented here concern exclusively capturability and thus they depend only on the graph G and the state s to which they refer (and thus on the number of players, their locations and whose turn is to move). Payoffs and initial states play no role. This motivates us to define a CR-pregame 11Γ (G) consisting of a graph G, N − 1 cop tokens and one robber token, where move and capture rules are the same as in SCAR Γ N (G|s 0 , γ, ε), but no payoffs or initial state are specified. These notions apply also to the games Γ m N (G|s 0 , γ, ε), including modified CR and to any other game sharing this basic structure, since, for any initial state s and strategy profile σ, the infinite history produced is the same in all of them.
First we define s-guaranteed capture profiles of k-th order, i.e. k-cops profiles which, when used in Γ N (G), guarantee capture from state s, no matter how the rest N − k players (including R) play.
Definition A.1 A k-cops profile σ = σ i 1 , ..., σ i k (k ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}) inΓ N (G) is called s-guaranteed capture profile (s-gcp) of k-th order iff, starting from s, the profile (σ, σ ′ ) leads to capture for all strategy profiles σ ′ = σ j 1 , ..., σ j N−k with {j 1 , ..., j N −k } = {1, ..., N } \ {i 1 , ..., i k } of the rest players.
Note that the definition of an s-gcp σ implies guaranteed capture by some (one or more) cops, but not necessarily by one of the cops involved in σ.
And now we define the state cop number c (G|s) inΓ N (G).
Definition A.2 Consider the pregameΓ N (G) (N ≥ 2) and s ∈ S nc .
1. If a k-th order (k ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}) s-gcp exists, then the state s cop number inΓ N (G) is denoted by c (G|s) and defined to be the minimum k for which such a k-th order s-gcp exists. that, starting from s 1 , C 1 can always ensure capture by going towards R and thus either effecting capture himself, or forcing R to run into C 2 . Hence c(G|s 1 ) = 1. 12 From s 2 = (6, 5, 3, 3) however ( Fig.  1.b) with R having again the move, both cops are needed to ensure capture and thus c(G|s 2 ) = 2.
Finally we present the following theorem which establishes the connection between c (G|s) and the classic cop number c(G). 
Proof. The complete proof will be given in a forthcoming paper. Here we give only the (short and plausible) proof of (40) which is what we will use in this paper. Assume c(G) > N − 1. This means there exists s ′ inΓ N (G) where the N − 1 available cops do not suffice to ensure capture. Then by definition of c(G|s) it is c(G|s ′ ) = ∞ and thus max s∈Snc c(G|s) = ∞. Conversely, max s∈Snc c(G|s) = ∞ implies there exists s ′ such that c(G|s ′ ) = ∞ and hence N − 1 cops do not suffice to ensure capture in Γ N (G) from state s ′ . Thus c(G) > N − 1.
